Opened 17 years ago
Last modified 16 years ago
#35 reopened defect
Set up iptables to not forward arbitrary packets to the backend
Reported by: | quentin | Owned by: | ecprice |
---|---|---|---|
Priority: | critical | Milestone: | Public Beta |
Component: | other | Version: | |
Keywords: | security | Cc: |
Description (last modified by quentin)
Currently the iptables rules don't REJECT or DROP anything; every packet a VM sends is ACCEPTed. This means VMs can send packets to our backend network, and black-mesa will happily forward them. We should change this.
Change History (7)
comment:1 Changed 17 years ago by broder
- Milestone changed from Alpha to Public Beta
- Owner changed from sipb-xen to ecprice
- Status changed from new to assigned
comment:2 Changed 17 years ago by price
- Milestone set to Public Beta
comment:3 Changed 17 years ago by price
- Description modified (diff)
- Summary changed from Change default iptables policy from ACCEPT to Set up iptables to not forward arbitrary packets
comment:4 Changed 16 years ago by broder
comment:5 Changed 16 years ago by broder
- Resolution set to invalid
- Status changed from assigned to closed
Sam Hartman wrote:
The current network config will not let a guest using invirt-route source packets unless the ip is correct. This is done using the RPF filter rather than iptables.
That's kind of what I expected.
comment:6 Changed 16 years ago by quentin
- Resolution invalid deleted
- Status changed from closed to reopened
That isn't the correct threat model; RPF prevents us from forged source addresses. It doesn't protect from legitimate packets addressed to the backend network. To whit:
root@sctv-television-rx:~# ping 10.5.128.17 PING 10.5.128.17 (10.5.128.17) 56(84) bytes of data.
--- 10.5.128.17 ping statistics --- 4 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 3009ms
root@aperture-science:~# tcpdump -i eth0 host sctv-television-rx.xvm tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 96 bytes 17:42:32.610776 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 1, length 64 17:42:33.620334 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 2, length 64 17:42:34.620373 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 3, length 64 17:42:35.620387 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 4, length 64
Guests should never be able to generate traffic on the backend network.
comment:7 Changed 16 years ago by quentin
- Description modified (diff)
- Summary changed from Set up iptables to not forward arbitrary packets to Set up iptables to not forward arbitrary packets to the backend
(fix the formatting of my comment, and make the description and summary accurate)
That isn't the correct threat model; RPF prevents us from forged source addresses. It doesn't protect from legitimate packets addressed to the backend network. To whit:
root@sctv-television-rx:~# ping 10.5.128.17 PING 10.5.128.17 (10.5.128.17) 56(84) bytes of data. --- 10.5.128.17 ping statistics --- 4 packets transmitted, 0 received, 100% packet loss, time 3009ms
root@aperture-science:~# tcpdump -i eth0 host sctv-television-rx.xvm tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v or -vv for full protocol decode listening on eth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), capture size 96 bytes 17:42:32.610776 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 1, length 64 17:42:33.620334 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 2, length 64 17:42:34.620373 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 3, length 64 17:42:35.620387 IP XVM-65.MIT.EDU > aperture-science-internal: ICMP echo request, id 46180, seq 4, length 64
Guests should never be able to generate traffic on the backend network.
Can anyone actually demonstrate that it's possible to send a packet whose source isn't the VM's IP address? I haven't been able to do this.