Changeset 2868

Timestamp:

Jan 9, 2010, 12:36:45 PM (15 years ago)

Author:

broder

Message:

Talk about how the Invirtibuilder is insecure.

File:

• trunk/packages/invirt-dev/README.invirtibuilder (modified) (2 diffs)

trunk/packages/invirt-dev/README.invirtibuilder

@@ -290 +290 @@
 way is deemed useful by the developers.
 
+Security
+========
+
+As noted above, our intent was for a single instance of the
+Invirtibuilder to be used for both our trusted production environment
+and our untrusted development environment. In order to be trusted for
+the production environment, the Invirtibuilder needs to run in the
+production environment as well. However, it would be disasterous if
+access to the development environment allowed a developer to insert
+malicious packages into the production apt repository.
+
+In terms of policy, we enforce this distinction using the remctl ACL
+mechanism described in `The Build Queue`_. But is that mechanism on
+its own actually secure?
+
+Only mostly, it turns out.
+
+While actual package builds run unprivileged (with the help of the
+fakeroot_ tool), packages can declare arbitrary build dependencies
+that must be installed for the package build to run. Packages'
+maintainer scripts (post-install, pre-install, pre-removal, and
+post-removal scripts) run as root. This means that by uploading a
+malicious package that another package build-depends on, then
+triggering a build of the second package, it is possible to gain root
+privileges. Since breaking out of the build chroot as root is trivial
+[#], it is theoretically possible for developers with any level of
+access to the APT repositories to root the build server.
+
+One minor protection from this problem is the Invirtibuilder's
+reporting mechanism. A single independent malicious build can't
+compromise the build server on its own. Even if a second build
+compromises the build server, the first build will have already been
+reported through the hook mechanism described in `Build Failures`_. We
+encourage users of the Invirtibuilder to include hooks that send
+notifications of builds over e-mail or some other mechanism such that
+there are off-site records. The server will still be compromised, but
+there will be an audit trail.
+
+Such a vulnerability will always be a concern so long as builds are
+isolated using chroots. It is possible to protect against this sort of
+attack by strengthening the chroot mechanism (e.g. with grsecurity_)
+or by using a more isolated build mechanism
+(e.g. qemubuilder_). However, we decided that the security risk didn't
+justify the additional implementation effort or runtime overhead.
+
 .. _config-package-dev: http://debathena.mit.edu/config-packages
+.. _fakeroot: http://fakeroot.alioth.debian.org/
 .. _git-buildpackage: https://honk.sigxcpu.org/piki/projects/git-buildpackage/
+.. _grsecurity: http://www.grsecurity.net/
 .. _Invirt: http://invirt.mit.edu
+.. _qemubuilder: http://wiki.debian.org/qemubuilder
 .. _remctl: http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/software/remctl/
 .. _SIPB: http://sipb.mit.edu
@@ -306 +354 @@
        create new tags for builds on pockets with
        ``allow_backtracking`` set to ``True`` either.
+.. [#] http://kerneltrap.org/Linux/Abusing_chroot